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Recent studies (e.g., Kuhn and Tatler, 2005) have suggested that magic tricks can provide
a powerful and compelling domain for the study of attention and perception. In particular,
many stage illusions involve attentional misdirection, guiding the observer’s gaze to a
salient object or event, while another critical action, such as sleight of hand, is taking
place. Even if the critical action takes place in full view, people typically fail to see it due to
inattentional blindness (IB). In an eye-tracking experiment, participants watched videos of
a new magic trick, wherein a coin placed beneath a napkin disappears, reappearing under
a different napkin. Appropriately deployed attention would allow participants to detect the
“secret” event that underlies the illusion (a moving coin), as it happens in full view and
is visible for approximately 550ms. Nevertheless, we observed high rates of IB. Unlike
prior research, eye-movements during the critical event showed different patterns for
participants, depending upon whether they saw the moving coin. The results also showed
that when participants watched several “practice” videos without any moving coin, they
became far more likely to detect the coin in the critical trial. Taken together, the findings
are consistent with perceptual load theory (Lavie and Tsal, 1994).
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, magicians and scientists have always engaged in a
discourse, typically leading to magicians applying the newest
technological innovations for use in deceiving the masses. This
was the case with Robert-Houdin’s (1859) early use of electro-
magnetism to change the weight of a small box at the magician’s
will1. In recent years, the dynamic has shifted such that scientists
are becoming interested in the techniques employed by magi-
cians (Kuhn et al., 2008a; Macknik et al., 2008; Macknik and
Martinez-Conde, 2010). There is an increasing awareness that
magicians are informal cognitive scientists who continually test
hypotheses outside of the sterile confines of the laboratory. The
knowledge accrued through this informal experimentation can
guide formal scientific theories (Raz and Zigman, 2009) as well
as translate into fresh methodologies for studying phenomena in
the lab (Hergovich et al., 2011).
Thus far, the most fruitful collaborative effort between these
disparate groups has been in the study of attention and inatten-
tional blindness (IB), the tendency for people to miss salient pieces
of the environment when engaged in an attention-demanding
task (Kuhn and Martinez, 2012). Magic provides an ecologi-
cally valid arena for studying IB both in well-controlled labo-
ratory conditions (Kuhn et al., 2008b) and in conditions with
more natural performance and viewing (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005).
1Interestingly, Robert-Houdin’s demonstration was also credited as the only
use of magic as a means to preemptively diffuse a war, when he used his magic
to “weaken” one of the soldiers from the opposing army.
Furthermore, the collaboration is a natural fit, as magicians and
scientists share similar analogies when discussing attention, most
commonly speaking of the “spotlight of attention” (de Ascanio,
1964/2005; Kuhn and Martinez, 2012).
Binet (1894) was among the first to discuss IB in the context
of magical performance, over 100 years before Mack and Rock
(1998) coined of the term, saying:
When it is particularly important that certain peculiarities of
a trick be not observed, even in the broad light, matters are
so arranged that the attention of the spectators is drawn to
another point at the decisive moment. . . The attention is thus dis-
tracted. . . rendering invisible a spectacle which is perfectly visible
to all eyes (p. 564).
Despite this early observation, magic was not brought into the
laboratory to study IB for more than a century: Kuhn and Tatler
(2005) examined participants’ eye movements as they viewed
a live magical performance (by Kuhn) wherein appropriately
deployed attention would allow viewers to detect the method
underlying the magical effect. The trick began with the magician
placing a cigarette into his mouth and picking up a ligher to ignite
it. Just before lighting the cigarette, the magician discovers that he
has mistakenly placed the unfiltered end into his mouth. He reori-
ents the cigarette and then reveals that the cigarette lighter has
vanished. Following this revelation, he snaps his fingers to show
that the cigarette, too, has vanished. The disappearances of both
the cigarette and the lighter are accomplished by dropping the
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objects into the magician’s lap, however the spectator’s attention
is carefully choreographed so that these actions elude detection.
The lighter is dropped while attention is captured by the readjust-
ment of the cigarette, and the cigarette is dropped precisely at the
moment that the disappearance of the lighter is revealed.
The primary dependent variable in Kuhn and Tatler’s (2005)
experiment was detection of the cigarette drop, a highly salient,
moving visual stimulus against the dark background of the magi-
cian’s shirt. IB was assessed through self-report. Participants were
asked whether they knew how the cigarette had been made to
vanish. Out of 20 participants, only two reported seeing the
falling cigarette. Nevertheless, examination of eye movements
revealed few differences between participants who detected the
drop and those who did not. While the cigarette was falling, all
participants were fixated on quite similar regions of the scene
(usually the magician’s hand, opening to show that the lighter had
vanished). Furthermore, when allowed to view the magic trick
again, although all participants detected the dropping cigarette,
only four shifted their gaze to the cigarette as it was falling.
Overall, participants tended to fixate the same regions during
both viewings of the magic trick, suggesting that detection of the
critical event depended upon the deployment of covert, not overt
attention.
In a follow-up study, using better-controlled video-based stim-
uli of the same magic trick, Kuhn et al. (2008b) again found that
IB could not be predicted by the proximity of participants’ fix-
ations to the falling cigarette. However, IB could be predicted
by patterns of fixations following the critical event. Participants
who detected the dropping cigarette fixated the hand that held the
cigarette earlier than participants who did not detect the drop.
These studies show the potential value of studyingmagic in the
laboratory, and they provide a strong foundation for the applica-
tion of magic in the study of attention. In the current work, we
hope tomove beyond the early studies by addressing some of their
limitations within a new methodology. First, as is often the case
in IB studies, the primary dependent measure implemented in
prior research using magic was self-report. In their treatise on the
topic, Mack and Rock (1998) reported a high rate of IB stimulus
detection in an experiment without an IB stimulus. That is, when
participants were asked whether they had seen anything in the dis-
play aside from the distractor stimulus (to which they attended in
order to perform the primary task), they often reported seeing an
additional stimulus when none was present. Thus, demand char-
acteristics are a genuine concern in this type of research. The use
of magic adds a secondary concern to the self-report problem, the
problem of inference. If participants feel compelled to provide a
possible explanation, rather than admitting that they did not see
how the cigarette disappeared, it is likely that many could infer the
true method. Inference would result in these participants being
incorrectly categorized as having detected the drop.
Kuhn et al. (2008b) presented a compelling case that their
results were not undermined by participant inference. In addition
to asking participants whether they detected how the cigarette
vanish was accomplished, they asked how the lighter disappeared.
None of the participants who detected the cigarette drop claimed
knowledge of how the lighter was made to vanish. Had they
inferred information about the cigarette, it would not have been a
far leap to generalize that inference to the lighter. Using a similar
magic trick, Kuhn and Findlay (2010) introduced an experimen-
tal manipulation to assess the potential for inference. In their
experiment, a cigarette lighter was made to vanish in a method
analogous to that used in Kuhn’s previous experiments. However,
Kuhn and Findlay also created a “fake” condition, wherein they
digitally removed the falling cigarette lighter from the video.
Thus, any detection of the dropping lighter in this condition could
only be the result of inference, as there was no stimulus to detect.
In the fake condition, none of the participants reported seeing
how the lighter was made to vanish. However, when prompted
to guess at the method, 40% of participants correctly inferred
that the lighter was dropped. In the “real” condition (wherein the
lighter was visibly dropped), none of the IB participants inferred
the correct method. These results suggest that participants can
successfully dissociate perception from inference and are gener-
ally honest in their self-reports, but it would clearly be preferable
to implement methods that disallow inference in future studies.
A second limitation of previous experimental work using
magic to study IB is the extremely short duration of the critical
stimulus event. The dropping cigarette was visible for an aver-
age of 140ms in Kuhn and Tatler (2005) and 240ms in Kuhn
et al. (2008b). In both experiments, the authors reported the
initially surprising finding that IB could not be predicted by eye-
movements while the falling cigarette was visible. This outcome
becomes less surprising when one considers that it takes upwards
of 150ms to program and execute an eye-movement, even when
the saccade target location is entirely predictable (Rayner, 1998).
Given the relative complexity of attentional deployment under
these dynamic viewing conditions, the time window of the IB
stimulus was unlikely to be wide enough for fixations on the
moving target to occur.
Perhaps more surprising than the inability to predict IB based
upon fixations on the dropping cigarette is the finding reported
by Memmert (2006) that IB in the now-famous “invisible gorilla”
video from Simons and Chabris (1999) could not be predicted
by the number of fixations or the absolute gaze duration on the
gorilla, which was visible for 5 s. However, this surface similarity
between findings from Memmert and Kuhn are qualified by sub-
stantial differences in methodology. One of the values of using
magic to study IB is that the participant-interpreted narrative
accompanying the magic plays the role of the primary task in
more traditional IB studies. In the task from Simons and Chabris,
time spent fixating the gorilla would have a detrimental effect
upon one’s ability to successfully perform the primary task (i.e.,
counting basketball passes). In Memmert’s replication, there was
not a reliable difference in performance on the primary task as a
consequence of IB, suggesting that even though the gorilla may
have transiently captured some participants’ attention, they were
motivated to perform well on the primary task, and did not spend
extra time fixating the unique character. This focus on the pri-
mary task is the likely source of the null effect of IB on fixations
to the gorilla, whereas the short duration of the IB stimulus is the
likely source of the non-effect in the experiments of Kuhn and
colleagues (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Kuhn et al., 2008b).
The current experiment addresses the limitations of previ-
ous IB research by using a unique methodology, borrowed from
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magicians, that also allows for control over a greater number of
variables than previous real-world experimentation into IB. Thus,
it has the potential to be a powerful tool in the study of attention
and eye-movements that can be adapted to study a multitude of
hypotheses. In the basic magic trick, adapted from Regal (1999),
an American half-dollar coin is placed on a dark-colored place-
mat and is covered by a napkin. Another napkin is placed on the
opposite side of the placemat. Next, an inverted cup is placed on
top of each napkin, after showing the inside of each to the cam-
era. The coin vanishes from its starting location and re-appears
beneath the opposite napkin. The method of the magic trick hap-
pens in full view; see Figure 1 in Methods and an example video
from an experimental trial in the SupplementaryMaterials. As the
inside of the first cup is being shown to the camera, the coin vis-
ibly slides across the placemat (with a mean duration of 550ms)
to its final position beneath the second napkin. The highly salient,
high-contrast coin movement often eludes detection due to mis-
direction provided by the action of showing the inside of the first
cup to the camera.
We used a novel two-alternative forced choice method to
assess IB. Participants’ eye movements were monitored while they
watched a video of the magic trick being performed. They were
only told that they should watch the video carefully, and that they
would be asked a series of questions about what they had seen
afterwards. In practice, participants were never shown the rev-
elation phase of the magic trick; they watched everything until
the revelation. At the end of the video, they were queried as to
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the actions from an experimental trial where
the coin moves from under the left napkin to the right napkin. (The
contrast of the coin in the central frame has been manipulated to enhance
the clarity of this graphic).
the location of the coin. Thus, for participants who did not see
the coin move, it felt like a very simple memory task, and they
would state that the coin was at its starting position under the first
napkin. However, if participants detected the coin’s movement,
they would say that the coin was beneath the second napkin.
Participants who incorrectly identified the location of the coin
were considered to be inattentionally blind.
Although we expected that our method would generally repli-
cate findings from Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005;
Kuhn et al., 2008b; Kuhn and Findlay, 2010), we also expected a
few points of deviation. First, although (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005;
Kuhn et al., 2008b) observed that eye-movements during the crit-
ical period (when the IB stimulus was visible) did not predict
IB, we expected that the longer visible duration of our IB stim-
ulus may allow eye movements to differentiate between IB and
no-IB participants. Specifically, we expected no-IB participants to
spend less time fixating the cup (which was shown to the camera
while the coin moved across the mat) and more time fixating the
space between the napkins (through which the coin moved). As
with previous research, we expected that eye movements follow-
ing the critical period would also indicate IB. Kuhn et al. (2008b),
Kuhn and Findlay (2010) found that participants who detected
the falling cigarette fixated the hand that previously held it sooner
than participants who did not detect the cigarette drop. Under
our methodology, we expected that participants who detected the
moving coin would be more likely to fixate the space through
which the coin moved or the end-point of the coin’s movement
sooner than participants who did not detect the coin.
The addition of a between-subjects condition in our method
also allowed us to test a hypothesis derived from magicians. In
their early work on IB, Mack and Rock (1998) asked participants
to judge which arm of a crossbar was longer and, in critical tri-
als, an additional stimulus was presented alongside the crossbar
which served as the IB stimulus. The IB stimulus was never pre-
sented in the first trial; participants completed a few trials of the
distractor task before it was presented. The structure of Mack
and Rock’s task resembles a structure commonly implemented in
magic performance.
Sleight of hand is often designed to emulate a non-deceptive
action sequence. For example, the French Drop sleight resembles
the action of transferring a coin from one hand to the other, while
actually retaining the coin in the original hand (Otero-Millan
et al., 2011). To increase the odds of deception, many magicians
advise that the deceptive action should be preceded by visually-
similar, non-deceptive actions (i.e., the actual transfer of the coin
from one hand to another) in order to condition the audience
to accept the sleight as a normal action (de Ascanio, 1964/2005;
Fitzkee, 1975; Sharpe, 1988; Lamont and Wiseman, 1999). Thus,
magicians would ascribe a portion of the IB effect from Mack
and Rock’s work to what magic theorist Arturo de Ascanio called
“conditioned naturalness” (de Ascanio, 1964/2005). By condi-
tioning the participants to expect a certain trial structure, they
become less apt to detect stimuli that do not fit within this
established structure. In the Preview Condition of the present
experiment, the critical trial (wherein the coin visibly moves
across themat) is preceded by three control trials wherein the coin
does not move. After each trial, participants are still queried as to
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the location of the coin. Magicians would predict that detection
of the coin’s movement under these conditions would be reduced,
due to the inherent conditioning of the trial structure.
However, an alternative prediction can be derived from per-
ceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995; Lavie et al., 2004). This theory
posits that distractor items (or the IB stimulus in Mack and
Rock’s, 1998, work) will be most likely to capture attention when
the “perceptual load” of the primary task is low. While Lavie
and Tsal (1994) admit that perceptual load is difficult to define
operationally, it is rather easy to conceptualize within the cur-
rent task. In the one-trial, No-Preview condition, participants
were given little direction other than to watch the video with the
goal of answering questions following its completion. This means
that the perceptual load for the task was quite high. Participants
attempted to attend to the video in its entirety, both in space and
time. However, in the multiple-trial, Preview condition, the per-
ceptual load required to successfully perform the task is reduced
with each subsequent trial. Participants quickly realize that they
need only encode the starting position of the coin to perform the
task successfully. This reduction in perceptual load across trials 1–
3 should free attentional resources to detect the coin in the critical
fourth trial, reducing the IB rate.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy-one Arizona State University undergraduates partici-
pated for partial course credit (37 in the No-Preview Condition;
34 in the Preview Condition). All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision.
MATERIALS
The magic trick was accomplished through the creation of a spe-
cial mat covered in fabric with a “busy” pattern. On top of this
fabric was an extra, ovular patch of the same fabric (invisible due
to the pattern) connected to a string which was threaded through
the mat, falling behind the table. The coin was placed on top of
this extra patch of fabric. After napkins were place over the coin
and over the spot on the opposite side of the mat, the inside of the
first cup was shown to the camera. At the same time, the magi-
cian pulled the string beneath the table, moving the patch across
the mat (taking the coin with it) to its final location beneath the
opposite napkin. Figure 1 shows the sequence of events contained
in one experimental trial video, wherein the coin moves from left
to right.
Four videos were filmed using a Canon Vixia HV40 HD cam-
corder. These videos were then digitized using Windows Movie
Maker and cropped to fill a screen with a 1024 × 768 aspect ratio.
Two videos were created for each coin starting position (two
with the coin starting on the left; two with the coin starting on
the right). In each pair of videos, one was for control trials in
Preview Condition wherein the coin remained in its starting posi-
tion, and one was for Experimental trials in both the No-Preview
and Preview Conditions wherein the coin moved across the mat.
In creating the stimuli, attempts were made to maintain consis-
tent timing of all action sequences across videos. The resulting
videos all had a duration of 22 s, with the exception of one con-
trol trial in which the coin was placed on the right side of the
mat, which had a duration of 21 s. Videos were presented at a
rate of 30 FPS. The moving coin was visible for an average of
16.5 frames (550ms; σ = 50) and moved in a trajectory that sub-
tended 4◦ of visual angle. Stimuli were presented on a 20-inch
NEC FE21111 CRT monitor (60Hz refresh) at a viewing distance
of 77 cm via SR Research Experiment Builder software running
on a Dell Optiplex 755 PC (2.66GHz, 3.25GB RAM). Eye move-
ments were collectedmonocularly at 500Hz using an SR Research
Eye-Link 1000 tracker with a spatial resolution of 0.01◦.
PROCEDURE
This experiment was approved by the Arizona State University
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. After establishing
informed consent, we calibrated participants on the tracker using
a nine-point calibration procedure. The calibration procedure
was repeated until the participant’s average error fell below 0.5◦ of
visual angle and no errors exceeded 1◦ of visual angle. Participants
were told that they would view a series of short videos and answer
questions after each one. The No-Preview condition contained
two trials. The first trial was the experimental trial wherein the
coin moved across the mat, with the starting position randomly
selected for each participant. After the trial, they were queried
about the coin’s location and provided with accuracy feedback
on their response. Accuracy on this task was used to assess IB.
Regardless of their accuracy, trial two was a free-viewing trial
where they watched the same video presented during trial one.
In the event that they did not detect the coin’s movement on
trial one, they were encouraged to “figure out where they went
wrong.” After trial two, they were asked whether they detected
how the coin arrived at its final location. If they responded affir-
matively, they were directed to describe exactly what they saw to
the research assistant, who categorized them as IB or no-IB on the
free-viewing trial.
The Preview condition was identical to the No-Preview con-
dition with the exception that the experimental and free-viewing
trials were preceded by three control trials wherein the coin did
not move from one position to the other. The coin’s position in
each control video was selected randomly for each participant.
Participants were queried on the coin’s location after each trial,
and accuracy feedback was provided.
RESULTS
INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS RATES
Four participants were excluded from the No-Preview condition
due to eye-tracker malfunction. Rates of IB in the experimental
trial were examined in a Pearson Chi-Square analysis with fac-
tor Preview (no-preview, preview), revealing a significant effect
of Preview, χ2(1) = 9.92, p = 0.002. In the No-Preview condi-
tion (the 2-trial condition), 18 out of 33 participants were blind
to the moving coin, while in the Preview condition (the 5-trial
condition), only 6 out of 34 participants failed to detect the coin.
A second Chi-Square analysis was carried out to examine
whether the direction of coin movement influenced IB. This anal-
ysis produced a null effect, χ2(1) = 0.21, p = 0.65, suggesting that
the videos were equivalently deceptive. When the coin moved
from left to right, 39% of participants were blind to its movement,
while 33% were blind to movement in the opposite direction. All
further analyses collapsed across the direction of coin movement,
in light of this null effect. A final Chi-Square analysis was carried
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out to explore rates of coin detection in the free-viewing trial.
Detection rates did not differ as a function of Preview, χ2(1) =
0.1.26, p = 0.26. Six participants still failed to detect the coin in
the No-Preview condition, and three participants who failed to
detect the coin in the experimental trial of the Preview condition
also missed the coin in the free-viewing trial.
EYE MOVEMENTS
Our first analysis examined fixation distances (in pixel space)
from the coin, measured at the midpoint of the coin’s movement
on the experimental trial. Figure 2 depicts the fixation locations
FIGURE 2 | Fixation locations at midpoint of coin’s movement on the
experimental trial as a function of Preview and Inattentional
Blindness. The overlay procedure used to create this graphic makes the
coins invisible, as they were in subtly different positions at their temporal
midpoint across the two experimental videos.
of participants as a function of Preview and IB. The mean fix-
ation distances are presented in Table 1. The Euclidean distance
was calculated from the fixation coordinates sampled at the tem-
poral midpoint of the coin’s movement and the coordinates of
the coin’s location. These values were then analyzed in a univari-
ate ANOVA with between-subjects factors Preview (no-preview,
preview) and IB (blind, not blind). This analysis produced only
a reliable effect of Preview, F(1, 63) = 5.08, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.08.
The fixation positions of participants in the Preview condition
were an average of 79 pixels closer to the moving coin than those
in the No-Preview condition. We carried out the same analysis on
fixation locations at the midpoint of the coin’s movement during
the free-viewing trial. On this trial, there was a marginal effect
of IB, F(1, 63) = 3.72, p = 0.058, η2p = 0.06, with IB participants
fixating locations farther from themoving coin than no-IB partic-
ipants. There was no effect of Preview, F(1, 63) = 1.78, p = 0.19,
η2p = 0.03.
Next, we examined the proportion of fixations falling upon
five different regions of interest (ROIs) during the entire 550-
ms critical period when the coin was visibly moving across the
screen in the IB trial: the napkin covering the coin’s starting
position, the napkin covering the coin’s end point, the space
between the napkins (through which the coin was moving), the
cup which was being displayed to the camera, and the magi-
cian’s face (which was partially occluded by the cup). Figure 3
depicts the pattern of fixations (shown as a heat map) during
the critical period as a function of coin movement direction and
IB, and Table 1 shows the probability of fixating each ROI as
a function of Preview Condition and IB. We conducted a mul-
tivariate ANOVA on the proportions of fixations falling upon
each ROI, with between-subjects factors Preview (no-preview,
Table 1 | Means (and Standard Deviations) for all eye-movement data.
Variable Preview No-Preview
IB No-IB IB No-IB
Fixation distance (in pixels) from moving coin on experimental trial 334 (122) 296 (123) 398 (122) 390 (125)
Fixation distance (in pixels) from moving coin on free-viewing trial 339 (224) 202 (137) 380 (156) 307 (143)
PROBABILITY OF FIXATION DURING CRITICAL PERIOD
Starting napkin 0.06 (0.14) 0.03 (0.11) 0.03 (0.12) 0.00 (0.00)
End napkin 0.00 (0.00) 0.07 (0.17) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.06)
Space between napkins 0.06 (0.14) 0.22 (0.35) 0.00 (0.00) 0.13 (0.23)
Cup 0.64 (0.73) 0.36 (0.38) 0.62 (0.32) 0.35 (0.33)
Face 0.00 (0.00) 0.11 (0.26) 0.19 (0.27) 0.19 (0.29)
PROBABILITY OF FIXATION DURING FREE-VIEWING TRIAL
Starting napkin 0.33 (0.29) 0.06 (0.17) 0.04 (0.10) 0.04 (0.13)
End napkin 0.17 (0.29) 0.16 (0.23) 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.16)
Space between napkins 0.17 (0.29) 0.37 (0.37) 0.08 (0.13) 0.18 (0.28)
Cup 0.17 (0.29) 0.16 (0.29) 0.28 (0.31) 0.35 (0.42)
Face 0.17 (0.29) 0.05 (0.13) 0.26 (0.25) 0.07 (0.18)
TIME TO FIXATE AFTER CRITICAL PERIOD (msec)
Starting napkin 1210 (1783) 2046 (1904) 1186 (1782) 1595 (1978)
End napkin 4539 (1182) 2591 (2807) 3426 (1445) 996 (1532)
Space between napkins 317 (242) 1180 (1405) 7687 (7148) 773 (765)
Face 2382 (3363) 3454 (2000) 892 (1509) 3004 (3083)
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preview) and IB (blind, not blind). The omnibus MANOVA did
not produce any effects related to Preview, but there was a reli-
able main effect of IB, F(5, 59) = 2.41, p = 0.047, η2p = 0.17. This
main effect was driven by differences in two ROIs. IB participants
were significantly more likely to fixate the cup during the crit-
ical period, F(1, 63) = 7.17, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.06. Furthermore,
IB participants were significantly less likely to fixate the space
through which the coin moved, F(1, 63) = 4.15, p = 0.046, η2p =
0.06. No other fixation patterns differed significantly as a
consequence of IB.
The same analysis was applied to fixations during the critical
period of the free-viewing trial, however, the outcome differed
(see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). The omnibus MANOVA
FIGURE 3 | Fixation patterns during the critical period as a function of
the direction of coin movement and inattentional blindness.
produced reliable main effects of Preview, F(5, 59) = 2.38, p =
0.049, η2p = 0.17, and IB, F(5, 59) = 2.96, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.20.
The Preview effect was driven by differences in the probability
of fixating the starting-point napkin during the critical period,
F(1, 63) = 7.26, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.10. Participants in the Preview
condition were more likely to fixate the starting-point napkin
(M = 0.19) than participants in the No-Preview condition (M =
0.04). There was also a marginal Preview effect upon the proba-
bility of fixating the end-point napkin, F(1, 63) = 3.45, p = 0.068,
η2p = 0.05. Participants in the Preview condition were more likely
to fixate the end-point napkin (M = 0.16) than those in the No-
Preview condition (M = 0.03). The IB effect was driven primarily
by differences in the probability of fixation in two ROIs. IB par-
ticipants were more likely to fixate the face, F(1, 63) = 5.94, p =
0.02, η2p = 0.09, and the coin’s starting position, F(1, 63) = 5.33,
p = 0.02, η2p = 0.08.
We also examined fixation patterns following the critical
period. Our first analyses examined how soon, following the
critical period, participants fixated each of four ROIs during
the experimental trial: the napkin covering the coin’s starting
position, the napkin covering the coin’s end position, the space
between the napkins (through which the coin moved), and the
performer’s face. These times to fixate were tested in individ-
ual ANOVAs with between-subjects factors Preview (no-preview,
preview) and IB (blind, not blind). Table 1 contains the average
times to fixate each ROI. There were no reliable differences in time
to fixate the starting-point napkin. However, there was a signifi-
cant IB effect on time to fixate the end-point napkin, F(1, 39) =
7.44, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.16. Participants who detected the coin’s
movement fixated the end-point napkin 2.19 s sooner than par-
ticipants who did not detect the coin’s movement. Analysis of
the time to fixate the space between the napkins produced two
FIGURE 4 | The proportion of each of the first five fixations falling in each ROI as a function of inattentional blindness.
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reliable main effects and a significant interaction. Participants
in the Preview condition fixated the space between the nap-
kins significantly sooner than those in the No-Preview condition,
F(1, 31) = 7.11, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.19. Furthermore, participants
who detected the coin’s movement fixated the space between
the napkins sooner than those who were inattentionally blind,
F(1, 31) = 5.37, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.15. These main effects were
qualified by a Preview X IB interaction, F(1, 39) = 8.87, p =
0.006, η2p = 0.22. In the No-Preview condition, participants who
detected the coin’s movement fixated the space between the nap-
kins almost 7 s sooner than IB participants, but the effect flipped
in the Preview condition, with IB participants fixating this space
863ms sooner than no-IB participants. Finally, there was a signifi-
cant IB effect on time to fixate the magician’s face, F(1, 63) = 5.85,
p = 0.02, η2p = 0.09. IB participants fixated the magician’s face
1.59 s sooner than no-IB participants.
We next turned to analyses of the sequence of fixations fol-
lowing the critical period. We performed a series of Pearson
chi-square tests of independence on the first five fixations that
participants made following the critical period to determine
whether fixation patterns differed as a consequence of IB. The
proportion of fixations falling within each ROI are shown in
Figure 4, and heatmaps of the first five fixations following the
critical period are in Figure 5.
The first four fixations following the critical period (but not
the fifth) differed significantly, based on IB. The distribution of
first fixations, χ2(3) = 13.59, p = 0.004, showed that participants
who were blind to the moving coin almost wholly fixated on the
magician’s face, while participants who detected the coin gener-
ally distributed their fixations between the endpoint of the coin’s
movement, the space between the napkins, and the magician’s
face. The distribution of second fixation landing points, χ2(3) =
15.50, p = 0.001, were shifted relative to the first fixation. IB par-
ticipants primarily fixated the napkin under which the coin was
initially placed, whereas participants who detected the coin were
primarily focused on the napkin covering the endpoint of the
coin’s movement and the space through which the coin moved. In
the third set of fixations, χ2(3) = 10.69, p = 0.01, IB participants
FIGURE 5 | Heatmap depicting the first five fixations following the
critical period as a function of the direction of coin movement and
inattentional blindness.
maintained their bias to fixate the starting position napkin, while
no-IB participants distributed their fixations across all ROIs, with
a slight bias to fixate the space through which the coin moved.
The fourth fixations, χ2(3) = 15.57, p = 0.001, showed the same
pattern. However, a chi-square test on the fifth set of fixations pro-
duced no effect, χ2(3) = 2.54, p = 0.47: Fixation patterns at this
point were no longer influenced by IB.
DISCUSSION
Our results replicate and extend the work of Kuhn and colleagues
(Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Kuhn et al., 2008b; Kuhn and Findlay,
2010) using a technique that improves upon prior magical meth-
ods that have been implemented in the laboratory. In the pure
form of the task (the No-Preview condition), just over half the
participants failed to detect a highly-salient, shiny object mov-
ing across the computer screen. This proportion was substantially
reduced in the Preview condition, with the addition of three con-
trol trials without an IB stimulus. Kuhn and Tatler (2005, Kuhn
et al., 2008b) observed that IB could not be predicted by fixa-
tion proximity to the IB stimulus during the critical period. As
in this previous work, participants’ fixation loci at the midpoint
of the critical period did not predict IB. However, participants in
the Preview condition tended to fixate closer to the IB event than
participants in No-Preview condition. Thus, the repeated-trial
structure influenced patterns of attentional deployment. While
the IB rate was reduced in the Preview condition, susceptibility to
IB was not influenced by participants’ fixations toward the mid-
point of the coin’s movement. This outcome suggests differential
deployment of covert attention in the Preview condition.
From their analogous result, Kuhn and Tatler (2005, Kuhn
et al., 2008b) concluded that oculomotor behavior during the
critical period does not predict IB. However, as already noted,
their IB stimulus had a very short on-screen duration. If we
expand the sampling window to include the entire 550-ms dura-
tion of the critical event, IB was signaled by participants’ eye
movements, unlike the outcomes reported by Kuhn and col-
leagues. For participants who detected the moving coin, a smaller
proportion of fixations fell upon the cup (which acted as a tool for
themisdirection of attention), relative to participants who did not
detect the coin, and more fixations fell upon the space between
the napkins. This suggests that Kuhn et al. (2008b) could not dif-
ferentiate participants based on fixation patterns because of the
short duration of their IB stimulus. With a longer IB stimulus (in
the absence of a perceptually demanding distractor task like that
of Simons and Chabris, 1999), eye movements do predict IB.
We also replicated the finding that fixation patterns after the
critical period differ as a consequence of IB. Participants who
detected the moving coin fixated both the space through which
the coin moved and its endpoint sooner than participants who
failed to detect the coin. This difference was magnified in the
Preview condition, wherein no-IB participants fixated the space
between the napkins almost immediately after the critical period.
Kuhn and Findlay (2010) observed that half of the participants
who detected the IB stimulus in their task made up to three sac-
cades before fixating the location where the IB stimulus appeared.
Similarly, Kuhn et al. (2008b) showed that the majority of partic-
ipants who detected the dropping cigarette fixated the magician’s
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face before moving their eyes to the space previously occupied by
the cigarette. This raises the question, how far beyond the criti-
cal period do fixation patterns differ as a consequence of IB? In
our task, IB groups differed in the first four fixations following
the critical period, but not the fifth, with IB participants showing
a tendency to fixate the coin’s starting position and no-IB partici-
pants showing a bias toward fixating the space through which the
coin moved, or the endpoint of the its movement. Given the dif-
ferences between our task and that of Kuhn and colleagues, the IB
participants may have been offloading the task of remembering
the coin’s location by maintaining fixation on the location where
they saw the coin being placed.
Beyond replicating and extending previous results, the cur-
rent experiment contributes to the burgeoning “science of magic”
(Kuhn et al., 2008a; Macknik et al., 2008; Macknik and Martinez-
Conde, 2010) by examining a long-held intuition of magicians,
the value of “conditioned naturalness” (de Ascanio, 1964/2005).
In order to mask a deceptive action, magicians advise that the
action it is meant to simulate should be carried out (ideally several
times) prior to the deceptive action. This prior experience with
the action is meant to condition the observer to accept the decep-
tive action sequence as natural. Under this logic, participants
should have been most susceptible to IB in the Preview condi-
tion, after having been conditioned to trials devoid of deception
(or, at least without an IB stimulus). However, despite identical
stimuli across conditions, participants in the Preview condition
were substantially less susceptible to IB than participants in the
No-Preview condition, the single-trial condition. This outcome
is predicted by an extrapolation of perceptual load theory (Lavie
and Tsal, 1994; Lavie, 1995; Lavie et al., 2004). Repeated experi-
ence with the trial structure reduces the perceptual load of the
task, freeing attentional resources to detect the IB stimulus in
the experimental trial. While it does not refute magic’s “natural
conditioning” hypothesis in all situations, the present experiment
deepens our understanding of the conditions under which the
hypothesis may or may not be applicable, just as recent research
testing illusory motion has highlighted conditions wherein joint
attention fails to enhance the perception of magic (Cui et al.,
2011).
Alternatively, the reduced IB that occurred with repeated tri-
als could reflect decreased novelty of the video, or interest in
the cup, over time. Participants who failed to detect the mov-
ing coin were continually engaged with the cup during the critical
period, while participants who detected the coin tended to fixate
the space between the napkins. Importantly this viewing pattern
did not differ significantly as a function of Preview condition.
Thus, it seems that the scope of attention differed by Preview con-
dition, rather than its placement, a conclusion that also aligns with
perceptual load theory. Further research could easily disentangle
these alternative interpretations through manipulation of interest
in the cup, itself. In the current stimulus, the magicians gazes into
the cup before presenting it to the camera, thus increasing interest
in the cup. Removing this gaze component may reduce IB rates, if
the novelty hypothesis is correct.
The ability to carry out this simple manipulation highlights
an attractive feature of the current method, which offers a versa-
tile tool for the study of IB under conditions of (almost) natural
viewing. Although a coin was used as the IB stimulus in the
current experiment, the method is quite flexible (e.g., the IB stim-
ulus could be any object small enough to fit upon the sliding
patch of fabric). In addition, the magician retains full control over
many variables that are relevant to IB, including the speed and
direction of the IB stimulus movement and social cues employed
to misdirect attention. As such, the current method allows for
re-examination of many variables from Mack and Rock (1998),
using a framework that better emulates visual perception and
attention in the real world.
The present task can also be adapted to address recent critiques
of the IB/attentional misdirection literature. Memmert (2010)
argued for an empirical dissociation between IB (i.e., Simons and
Chabris’, 1999, “Invisible Gorilla” experiment) and attentional
misdirection (i.e., Kuhn and Tatler’s, 2005, vanishing cigarette)
paradigms, citing four major distinctions between the typical
experimental protocols. One of his criticisms was that IB tasks
typically implement a full-attention control trial, whereas atten-
tional misdirection tasks do so inconsistently or ineffectively.
Memmert argued that control trials in the IB literature ensure
the visibility of the IB stimulus in the absence of the attention-
demanding primary task, and that it is impossible to create an
analogous situation in an attentional misdirection task because
the attention-demanding “primary task” is the inherent narrative
of the magical presentation that participants use to guide their
attention. In the current experiment, we implemented just such a
control trial (the free-viewing trial). Although not perfectly anal-
ogous to the control trial in IB experiments, our free-viewing
trial allowed participants to refocus their attention toward rele-
vant stimuli and away from misdirecting stimuli. Consequently,
IB was greatly reduced in these trials, and eye-movement patterns
changed substantially from the experimental trial.
The current task’s flexibility also allows for manipulations to
address Memmert’s (2010) three other critiques. A distractor task
(stimuli appearing within the cups) can easily be added to the
video to increase participants’ attentional workload. The magi-
cal methodology employed to move the item from one location
to another can be adapted such that the moving object is not the
object that was originally covered with a napkin (e.g., a copper
coin moves across the mat after a silver coin was placed beneath a
napkin). Thus, the identity of the IB stimulus would not be fore-
shadowed or integral to the narrative of the presentation, unlike
the stimulus in most attentional misdirection tasks.
Finally, the task reported here can be adapted to explore
larger questions associated with the relationship between eye-
movements and attention. Paradoxically, many prior experiments
have failed to find differences in eye-movements during the
critical period that would predict IB (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005;
Memmert, 2006; Kuhn et al., 2008b; Kuhn and Findlay, 2010).
These researchers have invoked covert attentional deployment to
explain these findings. As the name implies, covert attention is
difficult to measure. However, some researchers have suggested
that microsaccades, small fixational eye-movements, may point
to the locus of covert attention (Hafed and Clark, 2002; Engbert
and Kliegl, 2003; Hafed et al., 2011). By adding a distractor task
as outlined earlier, the current paradigm could become a multi-
trial divided attention task wherein IB (as measured by detection
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of the moving coin) can be assessed as a function of microsaccade
amplitude and direction.
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